Introduction
Marketing, operations management, and economics researchers have been interested in the conditions under which returns policies may coordinate channels and supply chains (Pasternack 1985; Marvel and Peck 1995; Padmanabhan and Png 1995; Kandel 1996; Tsay 2001; Cachon and Lariviere 2002; Granot and Yin 2002) . Padmanabhan and Png (1997) showed that with demand uncertainty, a returns policy could improve manufacturer profitability under certain conditions. They further claimed that, even in the absence of end-user demand uncertainty, a returns policy could raise manufacturer profitability by dampening price competition between retailers. However, this claim was disproved by Wang (2003) , who showed that returns policies do not change manufacturer profitability when demand is certain and retailing is competitive.
In this paper, we show that returns policies do increase manufacturer profitability by attenuating price competition between retailers, but, that this effect holds only in the presence of end-user demand uncertainty. Interestingly, the conditions under which a returns policy raises the manufacturer's profit are weaker when retailing is a duopoly than when retailing is a monopoly. This suggests that returns policies serve both to dampen competition and resolve demand uncertainty.
Setting
Let the information structure and sequence of actions be as follows. Initially, all parties are uncertain about the state of primary demand, which could be low or high (
or h respectively). The probability of demand being low is λ .
In the first stage, the manufacturer sets a distribution policy comprising a wholesale price w and whether to accept returns. In the second stage, the retailers independently order stocks i s . We assume that the true state of the primary demand is revealed to all parties after the second stage. Then, in the third stage, the retailers independently set prices,
Let demand at retailer 1 be
where the demand is more sensitive to the retailer's own price than the competitor's price in the sense that γ β > ,
and likewise for retailer 2. Information is symmetric: specifically, λ , θ α , β , and γ are known to all.
No Returns
In this case, the manufacturer sets a wholesale price w and does not accept unsold stock. Assume that, in stage 3, if demand is high, both retailers price to sell their entire stock, while if demand is low, both leave some stock unsold. Below, we derive a condition sufficient for this to be true.
By (1), if demand is low, retailer 1's sales are
By assumption, the retailers set price such that some stock will be unsold. Since unsold stock has no salvage value, retailer 1 would set price to maximize revenue
The first-order condition is
Similarly, retailer 2 would set price to maximize revenue, and its first-order condition would be
Solving (5) and (6), we have retailer 1's price if demand is low,
1 Another approach would be to assume that retailers set prices before the state of demand is revealed (Marvel and Peck 1995; Dana and Spier 2001; Marvel and Wang 2003). which, is also retailer 2's price in the case of low demand. Substituting (7) in (3),
By assumption, if demand is high, both retailers price to sell their entire stock. Then the sales of retailers 1 and 2 are
(10)
Solving,
In equilibrium,
and, likewise, for h p 2 .
In stage 2, the retailers choose stocks i s to maximize expected profit given the wholesale price w set by the manufacturer. Retailer 1's expected profit is
The first-order condition with respect to 1 s is
In stage 1, the manufacturer sets w to maximize profit
The first-order condition with respect to w is
Substituting for w in (14), we have
In equilibrium, we require that, if demand is low, both retailers leave some stock unsold, (8) and (17), this implies that
i.e., the high demand should exceed the low demand by at least the following extent,
Substituting for w in (15), the manufacturer's profit is
Substituting from (17) in (11), retailer 1's price when demand is high,
Full Returns
In this case, the manufacturer sets a wholesale price w and gives each retailer a full refund for unsold stock. In the Appendix, we show that, condition (18) implies that, in stage 3, if demand is high, both retailers price to sell their entire stock, while if demand is low, both leave some stock unsold.
By assumption, the retailers set price such that some stock will be unsold. Since the manufacturer accepts full returns of unsold stock, retailer 1 would set price to maximize profit
and, similarly, for retailer
Solving (23) and (24), we have retailer 1's price if demand is low, 
and likewise for retailer 2.
By assumption, if demand is high, both retailers price to sell their entire stock. Then the sales and prices of retailers 1 and 2 are given by (9) 
In stage 1, the manufacturer sets w to maximize profit 
Re-arranging terms and simplifying, we have (26),
Substituting from (31) in (11),
Full vis-à-vis No Returns
The following Table compares the profit-maximizing wholesale price, and equilibrium retail prices and quantities under the two scenarios of full and no returns. The difference in the manufacturer's profit in the two scenarios depends on a balance among the following:
• With returns, the wholesale price is higher and the retailers order larger stocks; • However, with returns, in the event of low demand, retailers return unsold stock and the manufacturer must bear the cost of these items. 
For tractability, we focus on the case where the marginal cost of the product, and
Substituting (37) in (36) and simplifying, we obtain 2 We omit the proofs of these results as they are mere algebraic substitutions. The exception is the proof that h p 1 is higher with no returns. Equation (12) defines the price h p 1 without and with returns. Since the stock is lower without returns, (12) implies that the price would be higher. 3 In the case of 0 = γ , these variables equal the corresponding terms in Padmanabhan and Png (1997) , Table 3 .
Comparing (38) with (35), the difference in the manufacturer's profit with and without returns,
say.
Note that, with
Further, the right-hand side of (42) is increasing in γ , and so, ) (λ X is increasing in γ , and thus, for
Therefore, the condition (40) for the returns policy to increase the manufacturer profit when retailing is a duopoly is weaker than the corresponding condition (41) when retailing is a monopoly.
Concluding Remarks
Here, we have shown that, in a setting of end-user demand uncertainty and retail duopoly, a returns policy would raise the manufacturer's profit if the marginal cost of the product is sufficiently low and the demand parameters satisfy particular conditions. Further, these conditions are weaker than the corresponding conditions for a returns policy to raise manufacturer profit with a retail monopoly. This shows that the returns policy serve both to dampen retail competition and resolve demand uncertainty.
Intuitively, the returns policy effectively sets a floor to the retail price when demand is low and so, attenuates price competition and raises the retailers' profits. This enables the manufacturer to set a higher wholesale price. Further, by eliminating any cost of excess inventory, the returns policy encourages retailers to order larger stocks.
From the manufacturer's viewpoint, the disadvantage of the returns policy is the cost of items returned in the event that demand is low. Provided that the cost of the product is sufficiently low and the high demand is not too much larger than the low demand, the advantages of the returns policy outweigh the disadvantage.
